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CHAPTER 9 
Labor-Demand-Side Economic Development 
Incentives and Urban Opportunity 
Timothy J. Bartik 
This chapter focuses on "labor-demand-side" economic development policies 
that target specific firms or relatively narrowly defined groups of firms. The 
central focus: how such policies might broaden urban opportunities. 
The "labor-demand-side" economic development policies analyzed in this 
chapter are targeted government subsidies to firms, intended to affect labor 
demand. The targeting means that government either chooses which specific 
firms get subsidies, or which groups of firms undertaking the desired actions 
get subsidies. Subsidies may be financial; for example, consider a property tax 
abatement to reduce a firm's property taxes below their usual level, which may 
be offered to entice a new branch plant to locate in a particular local area. Sub-
sidies may be customized services; as part of an economic development 
deal, a new or expanding firm may be offered a free training package from 
a local community college, which will train workers for that specific firm's 
needs. 
In the United States, these subsidies are mostly financed and run by state 
and local governments, sometimes with federal help. These subsidies' cen-
tral goal is typically to increase the quantity and quality oflocal jobs in a lo-
callabor market, such as a metro area or a state. 
Some subsidies go beyond promoting overall job growth for the metro 
area or state to promoting more specific forms of economic development. 
For example, some subsidies also aim to help employ the disadvantaged. 
Such subsidies include tax credits or cash payments that are conditioned 
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on employers hiring the long-term unemployed, or welfare recipients, or other 
needy groups. Other subsidies aim at redeveloping specific neighborhoods 
or land parcels within metro areas. These subsidies include enterprise zone 
programs for distressed neighborhoods, and brownfield development policies. 
Labor-demand-side incentives for firms are not the only way to promote 
state or local economic development. The quantity or quality oflocal jobs may 
also be increased by other policies. For example, local labor supply policies 
may increase the numbers or wages of local jobs by attracting new workers 
to the local area, or by improving local workers' education. Other state and 
local policies may affect labor demand, for example local labor demand will 
be affected by overall state and local taxes and spending. 
But targeting specific firms or groups of firms for incentives is more 
politically controversial. The immediate benefits of such incentives go to 
firms. Are there broader benefits for local residents, which might justify 
incentives' costs for local taxpayers? Furthermore, there is the important 
issue of fairness across different firms. Under incentive programs, either indi-
vidual firms are chosen to receive incentives, or groups of firms receive spe-
cial tax breaks or services because they invest in a narrowly defined area or 
hire certain workers. Other firms do not receive these incentives. Are there 
sufficient social benefits from this assistance to specific firms or specific groups 
of firms that might justify this differential treatment? 
This chapter focuses on how such labor-demand-side incentives might 
broaden economic opportunities, particularly for urban residents. The chap-
ter identifies "leakages" that impede subsidies to firms from expanding op-
portunities. Leakages include subsidizing jobs that would have been created 
anyway, subsidizing jobs that substitute for other jobs (both within a local 
area, and across the entire United States), and creating jobs for persons who 
otherwise would have found similar jobs. The chapter also discusses "multi-
plier" effects beyond the subsidized firms. Multipliers include increased de-
mand for local suppliers to the subsidized firms, increased local consumption 
spending by workers in the subsidized firms, and technology spillovers from 
subsidized firms to other local firms. For incentives to have higher ratios of
benefits to costs, policy makers must better target such subsidies, both to in-
crease multipliers and to reduce leakages. State and local governments have 
some reasons to better target incentives, but federal policy may also be needed, 
particularly when a state's subsidies produce negative spillovers, for example 
by reducing jobs in other states. 
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This chapter's empirical findings conclude that labor-demand-side eco-
nomic development incentives are most effective if provided in the form of 
customized services. These customized services provide information or job 
training that is in short supply to many small and medium-sized businesses, 
and that can provide a high bang for the economic development buck. Tax 
incentives for economic development can work, but only if carefully targeted 
at high-wage firms with high local multipliers in the local export-base sec-
tor. For hiring subsidies for the disadvantaged, the available evidence is that 
such tax or other cash incentives are more effective if combined with screening 
and training services that help assure firms that these hires will be produc-
tive. For neighborhood development subsidies for distressed neighborhoods, 
the evidence suggests that tax incentives for firm location or expansion are 
more effective if combined with support for neighborhood services that will 
make the neighborhood more productive for business. When there are real 
barriers to using some factor of production, whether it is disadvantaged 
workers or distressed neighborhoods, cash alone as an incentive for such 
utilization is more effective if combined with services that help overcome the 
real barriers to employing these workers or utilizing this land. 
The next section further describes economic development subsidies. After 
that, a logic model will be presented for understanding subsidy effects. Evi-
dence on subsidy effects will then be summarized. This theory and evidence 
lead to policy recommendations. 
The Varieties of Economic Development Subsidies 
Although all state and local policies affect local jobs, "labor-demand-side" 
economic development incentives are distinguished by being targeted with 
discretion at specific firms or at groups of firms that invest in specific areas or 
hire specific workers. This targeting allows greater flexibility in achieving policy 
goals, while also allowing a greater chance for costs to escape accountability. 
Economic development subsidies include financial subsidies and custom-
ized services. Either of these types may be further targeted at hiring specific 
types of workers, or targeted at specific geographic areas within the local 
area. Both financial subsidies and customized services may sometimes be 
combined to encourage economic development. For example, the federal 
Empowerment Zone program of the 1990s, to be discussed further below, 
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combined both tax incentives and subsidies for services in encouraging re-
development of distressed neighborhoods. As another example, Minnesota's 
MEED program of the 1980s, also to be discussed further below, combined 
cash incentives for firms hiring the long-term unemployed with screening 
and training services. 
Financial subsidies include tax incentives. For example, property tax
abatements reduce a new or expanding firm's tax rate. Firms may also be pro-
vided with free land, grants for research and development, or loans at below-
market interest rates. 
These subsidies also include customized services. A frequently provided 
customized service is free or subsidized job training customized to the indi-
vidual firm's needs. This may include job training for new hires in expand-
ing firms, or job training for new hires or incumbent workers in firms facing 
competitive threats. Such subsidized or free job training is most commonly
provided by local community colleges. 
Other customized services address a firm's specific infrastructure needs. 
Access roads may be provided on an expedited basis to a firm's new site. 
Infrastructure may be paid for by tax increment financing, in which the 
property tax increment from new development within a specified area is 
devoted to infrastructure within that area. 
Many customized services are informational. Economic developers help 
individual firms to deal with regulations and government programs. Entre-
preneurs and new firms may be provided with entrepreneurial training and
advice. Manufacturing extension services may help small or medium-size 
manufacturers with advice on upgrading the firm's technology, human re-
sources, marketing, or products. 
As will be reviewed below, the empirical evidence suggests that custom-
ized services are frequently more cost-effective, compared to tax incentives 
or other financial incentives, in achieving economic development goals. Why
this is so will be clearer as we discuss the logic of economic development and
the evidence. 
Financial subsidies and customized services are often specific to partic-
ular firm types. Firms targeted by economic developers are usually "export-
base": businesses that sell most of their goods or services outside the state or
local economy. (See below for why such targeting makes sense from a state 
or local perspective.) Targeted firms may be required to pay a "living wage." 
Informational services often specialize in particular business types, such as 
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start-ups, small business, manufacturing, or high technology. High-tech clus-
ters are often given special attention. 
Some subsidies are tied to hiring from disadvantaged groups. Hiring in-
centives may be provided by tax credits. Hiring incentives are sometimes pro-
vided not as tax incentives but as explicit cash spending supported by the 
spending oflocal workforce agencies, tied to hiring the disadvantaged work-
ers who are trained or screened by these agencies' programs. Some regular 
tax incentives for economic development purposes are transformed in part 
into hiring incentives by being tied to "first source agreements." Under such 
agreements, a firm can only receive an economic development tax incentive 
(e.g., a property tax abatement) if the firm agrees to make a good faith at-
tempt to use local workforce agencies as a "first source" for entry-level hires 
(Bartik 2001; Molina 1998). As will be reviewed below, the empirical evidence 
suggests that tax credits or other financial incentives for hiring the disadvan-
taged are more effective if tied to workforce services that help assure firms of 
these workers' productivity. 
Although most subsidies aim at job growth for an overall metro area, 
some subsidies may promote development only for smaller areas. One ex-
ample is enterprise zones, in which firms in some neighborhood are made 
eligible for subsidies. Another example is brownfield programs, which promote 
the redevelopment of contaminated land. These neighborhood and land de-
velopment subsidies vary in whether they exclusively rely on tax incentives 
and other financial services, or whether they also include services. For exam-
ple, most state enterprise zone programs rely exclusively on tax incentives 
for redeveloping targeted distressed neighborhoods. In contrast, the federal 
Empowerment Zone program of the 1990s expanded on the enterprise zone 
concept by combining tax incentives with considerable funds for expanding 
services in distressed neighborhoods. As will be reviewed below, the empirical 
evidence suggests that adding services to tax incentives is more effective in 
redeveloping neighborhoods with significant development barriers. 
Despite this variety, the bulk of economic development subsidies are tax 
incentives. For example, in one study of Michigan, about two-thirds of eco-
nomic development subsidies are tax incentives (Bartik 2011). 
Most economic development subsidies are financed by state and local 
government. However, the federal government has provided subsidies for 
neighborhood development (e.g., Empowerment Zones), hiring the dis-
advantaged (e.g., Work Opportunity Tax Credits), small businesses (Small 
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Business Development Centers), and manufacturers (Manufacturing Exten-
sion Partnership). 
Economic development incentives for firms may total $40 billion a year 
(Bartik 2001). Total incentives are higher if we include "tax expenditures" that
entitle all businesses meeting the law's criteria to a tax break. For example, 
journalist Louise Story of the New York Times concluded that economic 
development subsidies were $80 billion/year nationally, but $50 billion was 
due to state tax laws exempting interbusiness sales from the sales tax (Story 
2012; K. Thomas 2012). Kenneth Thomas (2010) estimates that annual eco-
nomic development subsidies are $70 billion, but his total includes tax ex-
penditures. Distinguishing incentives that target specific types of firm 
behavior, from more general tax provisions that define business tax bases, is 
not always straightforward. 
This dizzying array of highly varied economic development financial sub-
sidies and services for firms poses a challenge for policy evaluation. How are 
we to understand these programs' effects? To do so requires a specific model 
for evaluating the benefits and costs of such assistance to firms, which will 
be developed in the next section. The model used here focuses on how much 
incentives cost per net job created, and what benefits jobs created provide in 
higher earnings per capita. The model used here will consider such costs and
benefits both from a local perspective and a national perspective. The local 
perspective generates such questions as these: how many jobs at what cost 
does this program create in this state or metro area? How do such jobs affect 
state or metro area earnings per capita? The national perspective generates 
such questions as these: how many jobs at what cost does this program cre-
ate on net in the nation? How do such jobs affect national earnings per cap-
ita? The two perspectives differ because jobs and earnings created in one local 
area may come at the expense of other local areas. 
As will be explored in the empirical section, the evidence suggests that
customized services to firms, compared to financial subsidies for firms, are 
not only more effective from a local perspective, but from a national perspec-
tive, in increasing earnings per capita. From a national perspective, boost-
ing productivity, which customized services can do, is more economically
efficient than simply providing financial subsidies that alter business loca-
tion patterns. In addition, combining services with cash subsidies, rather than
cash subsidies alone, to redevelop distressed neighborhoods, or to encour-
age hiring of the disadvantaged, is more effective in boosting earnings per
capita not only from a local perspective but also from a national perspective. 
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Overcoming the real barriers to employing the disadvantaged, or to utiliz-
ing distressed land, enlarges both local and national economic output. 
A logic Model for Effects of Economic 
Development Incentives 
This chapter now turns to outlining a "logic model" for how economic de-
velopment incentives for firms affect earnings per capita. The model begins 
by considering effects for local earnings per capita, before going on to con-
sider national earnings per capita. 
Earnings per capita is the focus because it is the most important benefit 
oflocal job growth. For example, one study found that increases in earnings 
per capita from local job growth were at least four times the annual equiva-
lent value of increases in land values, and at least five times the increase in 
fiscal benefits for state and local governments (Bartik 2005).1 
What factors alter the "bang for the buck" of incentives in boosting 
earnings per capita? Figure 9.1 outlines a logic model for how incentives in-
crease earnings per capita, identifying leakages that reduce the bang for the 
buck, and multipliers that increase it. 
The first leakage is that only some proportion of the incentives actually 
changes firms' behavior. Economic developers may claim that tax incentives 
are costless because no tax revenue would have been created without the new 
plant. But this claim assumes that 100 percent of the incented business ac-
tivity is due to the incentive, which is false. 
A second leakage occurs if the incented business does change its behav-
ior, but this business activity directly substitutes for some other business ac-
tivity. For example, if the incented business was attracted by a vacant site or 
available labor, this site or labor might have attracted some other firm. 
A third leakage occurs if the incentive goes to a locally oriented firm sell-
ing to a local market. If so, then the expansion of the incented business re-
duces local markets available to other local firms, thereby reducing their 
activity. In contrast, if incentives go to businesses that are "export-base"-
businesses that sell their goods and services outside the local area-then the 
incented business brings new money into the metro economy. 
One multiplier effect is the traditional Keynesian multiplier at the local 
level. The incented business will use local suppliers, increasing their jobs. The 
workers in both the incented business and local suppliers will spend some 
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Figure 9.1. This logic model illustrates how economic development policies affect 
earnings per capita. 
wages on locally produced goods and services. These multiplier effects de-
pend on the incented business's local supplier network, which is more exten-
sive in larger metro areas. Multiplier effects will also be larger if workers in 
incented businesses or suppliers are paid more. Multiplier effects are larger 
if more consumption goods are produced locally, which is higher in larger 
metropolitan areas. 
Another multiplier is wage norm effects if the business pays wages above 
or below normal wages for workers of that skill level. Evidence suggests that 
when the local industry mix shifts to high-wage industries, local wages go up 
by about twice what would be expected based on direct effects (Bartik 1993). 
Another type of multiplier is "agglomeration economies" due to either 
greater overall local activity or a larger industry cluster. Agglomeration ef-
fects are cost savings associated with higher industry concentrations of em-
ployment or greater urban size. These agglomeration economies may be based 
on having thicker markets for workers and suppliers, which allow economies 
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of scale that make it easier locally to access more specialized suppliers and 
workers. Agglomeration economies may also be due to sharing of innovative 
ideas within or across metro industries. Agglomeration economies exist 
(Moretti 2010; Greenstone et al. 2010), but it is unknown whether they are 
subject to threshold effects. Therefore, it is unclear whether adding a specific 
firm to a metro area will add to agglomeration economies, which is what 
is relevant in evaluating incentive impacts. Overall multipliers, including 
agglomeration economies, may be greater for high-tech industries (Moretti 
2010). 
A negative feedback effect occurs due to greater local business activity 
pushing up local prices and wages. These increased local costs will reduce 
the attractiveness of the area for other business expansions. These negative 
feedback effects depend in part on how elastically the area supplies housing, 
which will depend on state and local housing regulations (Glaeser, Gyourko, 
and Saks 2006). 
A labor market leakage is that only a portion of the net new jobs created 
will increase the local employment rate. An increase in local jobs must in the 
end result in a combination of some reduction in local unemployment, some 
increase in local labor force participation, and some increase in local popu-
lation. Even if some of a new or expanding firm's hires are already employed, 
such hires create local vacancies. The chain of vacancies must ultimately 
result in either increases in local employment rates or the local population 
to match the increased local employment. The percentage increase in local 
employment must be approximately equal to the sum of the percentage in-
crease in the local employment rate plus the percentage increase in the local 
population:2 
(Eq. 1) % change in E ::::: % change in (EIP) + % change in P. 
In this equation, E is employment, and Pis population. 
In the short run, 40 to 80 percent of all jobs go to local residents, and the 
remainder go to persons who otherwise would have lived elsewhere. In the 
longer run, the percentage of new jobs that go to local residents is only 20 per-
cent, under normal labor market conditions (Bartik 1991, 2015). 
The persistence oflocal employment rate effects must reflect some endur-
ing changes in local workers' productivity in response to short-run labor 
demand increases. One plausible explanation is the better skills due to short-
run job experience (Phelps 1972; Bartik 2015). 
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Earnings effects are augmented by increases in local wages. The increase 
in local wages will be related to how much labor supply responds to the in-
crease in local demand. 
How labor demand shocks affect local employment rates and wages will 
depend on who gets the jobs in the short run (Persky et al. 2004). Who gets 
the jobs will depend on how well the newly created jobs match local skills. 
Who is hired also depends on institutional details, such as whether incented 
businesses work with workforce agencies to hire local residents. 
An additional issue is what proportion of earnings increases go to work-
ers at the bottom of the income distribution. The evidence suggests that lo-
cal growth shocks are modestly progressive: the percentage change in earnings 
is greater for low-income groups, but not the dollar change in earnings. The 
earnings effects of local labor demand increases are distributed as follows: 
for every dollar in increased earnings of the lowest-income quintile, about 
$2 goes to the middle-income quintile, and $3 goes to the highest-income 
quintile (Bartik 2011). But earnings effects as a percent of income for the 
lowest-income quintile are about twice those of the middle-income quin-
tile, and about five times the percentage effects for the highest-income 
quintile. 
All of these effects are for a metropolitan area. From a national perspec-
tive, when jobs expand in one metropolitan area, this reduces markets for 
firms in other metro areas. This zero-sum game aspect oflocal development 
is reduced if the policy does not simply induce job growth, but also increases 
productivity, which enlarges the national economic pie. Productivity is 
enhanced when firms use resources more productively than they other-
wise would be used, which may occur due to better worker skills or firm in-
formation, or by firms utilizing land and labor that otherwise would be 
underutilized. 
Empirical Evidence 
This section considers empirical evidence for financial subsidies and custom-
ized services, before considering the special issues of hiring incentives and 
neighborhood incentives. 
To focus ideas, the preceding section can be summarized by some sim-
plified equations for the annual costs and benefits per job created by an eco-
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nomic development policy. Because the total additional jobs created in some 
geographic area will equal the jobs directly created by the policy, times the 
multiplier effect of those jobs, the cost per additional job will go up with a 
higher cost per directly induced job, and will go down with a higher multiplier: 
(Eq. 2) Costs/additional job= Costs/ (directly-induced job*multiplier) 
=(Costs per directly-induced job) times 
(1/multiplier). 
The benefits for the residents of some geographic area of creating jobs will 
go up with higher earnings of those jobs. The benefits will also go up with a 
higher fraction k of those jobs' earnings that benefit the residents of that geo-
graphic area, either by increasing the employment rates oflocal residents, or 
increasing their real wages: 
(Eq. 3) Benefits per additional job= (fraction k) times (average 
earnings per additional job). 
In these equations, all elements are affected by the factors discussed in 
the preceding section.3 What does the empirical evidence show? 
Financial Subsidies 
For tax incentives, the empirical evidence suggests that from a state and 
local perspective, net benefits are closely balanced, and sensitive to plausible 
variations in effectiveness and multipliers. Net national benefits are unlikely. 
Empirical findings for tax incentives are based on how state and local 
business activity responds to state and local business taxes. Economists de-
scribe this sensitivity by the "elasticity" of state and local business activity 
with respect to state and local taxes, where "elasticity" is defined as the ratio 
of the percentage change in local business activity to the percentage change 
in state and local business taxes. We would expect this ratio to be negative, 
as we would expect lower (higher) business taxes to induce more (less) local 
business activity. This research literature suggests a long-run elasticity of state 
and local business activity with respect to state and local business taxes of 
somewhere between -0.05 and -0.6, with a central value of -0.2 (Bartik 1991; 
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Wasylenko 1997). This central value of -0.2 means that if all state and local 
business taxes were reduced by 10 percent, we would expect that an area's 
business activity would in the long run increase by 2 percent. Direct evidence 
on incentives is consistent with this estimated sensitivity to costs (Bartik and 
Hollenbeck 2012; Moretti and Wilson 2014). 
At a -0.2 elasticity, the incentive costs per induced job would be 
$30,000/year. This is the annual cost to induce one additional local job.4 This 
incentive cost can be expressed as the probability that a typical incentive 
package, which averages $1,300 annually per job, would tip a location deci-
sion. This typical package would tip the location decisions of 4.3 percent of 
all jobs provided incentives. If the cost of inducing a new job is $30,000, then 
an incentive package of $1,300 annually, to be equally cost-effective, will 
induce only 1,300/30,000 = 4.3 percent of all incented decisions.5 Without 
incentives, at least nineteen of twenty firms would have chosen the same 
location. 
But because the research is consistent with a range of elasticities, there is 
also a large range of incentive costs. If the elasticity of business activity with 
respect to costs is only -0.05, then the incentive costs per directly induced 
job would be $121,000 annually per job and the typical incentive package 
would only tip 1.1 percent of all jobs incented. At a -0.6 elasticity, the an-
nual costs per directly induced job would be only $10,000 and the typical in-
centive package would tip 13 percent of all location decisions. 
These costs per directly incented job must be combined with net multi-
plier effects, as shown above in equation (2). For example, if one-third of the 
jobs go to export-base jobs, and the multiplier for export-base jobs is two, ,
the net multiplier is 0.67. As equation (2) shows, the cost per net additional 
job is equal to the cost per directly induced job, divided by the multiplier. 
With a net multiplier of 0.67, the cost per net additional job will be 150 per-
cent of the costs per directly induced job. 
Benefits will depend on how well these jobs pay, what fraction of these 
jobs go to the unemployed and those out of the labor force, and the extent to 
which the jobs increase wages. Empirical estimates suggest that on average, 
a new job will yield long-run increases in earnings per capita of about 40 per-
cent of the new job's earnings, half due to higher employment rates, and half 
due to higher real wages (Bartik 1991). If we assume that any leisure loss due 
to higher employment is offset by reduced stigma effects of unemployment 
(Bartik 2015), then all of the earnings increase due to higher employment 
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should be counted as benefits. If we adopt a local perspective, or a worker per-
spective, the increased earnings due to higher wages should also be counted 
as social benefits (most of the profit reduction due to higher wages will affect 
absentee owners of capital). If we count all earnings benefits as social bene-
fits, and if new jobs had average gross compensation of $50,000, then the so-
cial benefits of each new local job would be $20,000. 
Whether or not business tax incentives pay off depends critically on the 
elasticity of business location decisions, and the multiplier. If one assumes a 
high elasticity and high multiplier, then business tax incentives are frequently 
likely to pay off from a state and local perspective. With a more conservative 
elasticity and a low multiplier, business tax incentives are highly unlikely to 
pay off. If the elasticity is close to -0.2, with a modest multiplier, then incen-
tive costs and benefits from a state and local perspective will be closely 
balanced. For example, with a multiplier of 1.5, costs of job creation will 
be around $20,000 per job, and if the jobs pay around $50,000 on average, 
the social benefit per job created will also be about $20,000. 
Empirical research on specific tax incentives finds wide variation in lo-
cal benefit-cost ratios. For example, one study of a Michigan tax incentive 
program found that the program likely had high local benefits relative to 
costs, because it was tightly targeted on high-wage export-base businesses 
with extensive local supplier networks and high multipliers (Bartik and 
Erickcek 2014). A study of a state of Washington tax incentive program found 
that the program was less likely to pass a local benefit -cost test, because many 
incentives went to non-export base businesses or subsidized firm activities 
that would have occurred anyway (Bartik and Hollenbeck 2012). 
From a national perspective, however, it is highly unlikely that discretion-
ary tax incentives pay off, at least at times when macroeconomic authorities 
are managing the economy to maintain full employment. From a national 
perspective, the jobs created in this state or metropolitan area will be mostly 
offset by jobs destroyed in other areas.6 
An exception might be incentives that encourage innovative high-tech 
industries, which might boost national productivity. But this depends on 
whether the incentives induce additional innovative activity, rather than sim-
ply relocations. Large effects on innovation might require larger government 
intervention than typical state and local tax incentives (Mazzucato 2013). 
Another exception might be job creation incentives when national un-
employment is high (Bartik and Bishop 2009). But such incentives are more 
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effective if deficit financed, and are more efficient if applied to all job creation, 
rather than job creation in firms chosen by local policy makers. 
Customized Services 
For customized business services, the sparse evidence suggests that some 
types of services may be far more efficient than financial incentives. The evi-
dence is strongest for customized job training and manufacturing extension 
services. A quasi-experimental study of firms with different access to cus-
tomized job training suggests that such job training has productivity ben-
efits that in just one year are about 1.8 times these programs' costs (Holzer 
et al. 1993; Bartik 2010). A quasi-experimental study of firms with different 
access to manufacturing extension services suggests that manufacturing ex-
tension has productivity benefits that in just one year are about 2.1 times pro-
gram costs (Jarmin 1998, 1999; Bartik 2010). 
The benefit/cost ratios for these services depend upon how long produc-
tivity effects persist. The Holzer et al. (1993) estimates suggest persistence, 
whereas Jarmin (1998) finds some depreciation. But even with considerable 
depreciation, these productivity benefits imply local employment effects that 
would be large compared to costs. Local employment effects would occur be-
cause higher productivity will lower local costs, increasing the attractive-
ness oflocal expansion. Suppose the productivity benefits of customized job 
training depreciate by 25 percent annually, that business location decisions 
have the cost sensitivity implied by a -0.2 business tax elasticity, and that the 
social discount rate is 3 percent. (The social discount rate is the annual in-
terest rate that helps translate between future annual flows of benefits or costs, 
measured in dollar terms, and today's dollars.) Then the annual equivalent 
cost per job created of customized job training would be $1,600 per job cre-
ated? Under similar assumptions, the annual equivalent cost per job created 
of manufacturing extension would be $1,300 per job created. 
Other evidence finds slightly higher costs per job created for customized 
services, but still much lower costs than for business tax incentives. Hollen-
beck (2008) uses surveys of firms to find that customized training grants in-
duce one direct new job for every $23,000 in one-time grants. Ehlen (2001) 
uses surveys of firms to find that manufacturing extension services induce 
one direct new job for every $18,000 in services. Suppose the jobs created 
depreciate at the rate of 25 percent per year, and the social discount rate is 
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3 percent. Then the Hollenbeck survey implies an annual cost per job cre-
ated of $6,000 for customized job training, and the Ehlen survey implies an 
annual cost per job created of $5,000 for manufacturing extension.8 These 
costs are somewhat higher than the previous estimates, but much lower than 
the annual costs of $20,000 per job created that might be found for business 
tax incentives. 
Why might manufacturing extension and customized job training be 
more effective than business tax incentives? Manufacturing extension ser-
vices are providing information to firms. Information is cheap to provide, 
yet can be quite valuable. 
For customized job training, such services will mostly be used by firms 
that value such training, whereas any firm will want the cash from tax in-
centives. Hiring workers requires large up-front costs for screening and 
training, and new hires frequently do not work out. In small and medium-
sized firms, "after six months on the job, more than one-quarter of new hires 
were producing less than 75 percent of what was anticipated when they were 
hired" (Bishop 1993: 336). A public program that screens and trains new 
hires to meet productivity standards will produce large immediate benefits. 
Community colleges have comparative advantages in providing training, 
which makes it plausible that the value of training will significantly exceed 
costs. 
For both manufacturing extension and customized job training, the ben-
efits for firms are front-loaded. Firms immediately benefit from savings on 
hiring costs and in productivity improvements. Because firms have large real 
discount rates in making decisions (a 12 percent annual rate estimated 
by L. Summers and Poterba 1994), and social discount rates are lower (a 
typical social discount rate ranges from 2 to 5 percent-Bartik 2011, Moore 
et al. 2004), there are social gains to providing benefits up front. 9 
A social benefit of customized training is that such training may encour-
age hiring of disadvantaged workers. To do so, customized training programs 
must seek such workers, and devote extra efforts to screen and train these 
workers up to job standards. Case studies suggest that some customized train-
ing programs are successful in involving disadvantaged workers (Batt and 
Osterman 1993). But there is little aggregate evidence on how the average 
customized training program affects who is hired. 
From a national perspective, manufacturing extension and customized 
job training are more likely to increase overall national output than are tax 
incentives that only relocate economic activity. Customized services also lead 
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to relocation of economic activity, but this relocation allocates economic ac-
tivity to more productive locations, which is efficient. 
Other customized services also have some evidence of effectiveness. A 
randomized experiment found that entrepreneurship training increases busi-
ness start-ups (Benus, Wood, and Grover 1994). Survey evidence of client 
firms, and before and after comparisons, indicate that firms that receive more 
intensive assistance from Small Business Development Centers (funded by 
the U.S. Small Business Administration, along with state and local govern-
ments) tend to be more successful (Chrisman et al. 2005; Chrisman 2002; Seo 
et al. 2012). Business incubators also have supportive evidence from client 
firm surveys, and before and after comparisons of client firms (Molnar et al. 
1997; Amezcua et al. 2013). 
The overall research evidence for customized business services is favor-
able but sparse. Much evidence is from surveys, or before and after compari-
sons. Only a few studies are quasi-experimental or experimental, which 
provide stronger evidence. 
Hiring Subsidies 
Subsidies for hiring the disadvantaged that only provide tax credits or cash 
are ineffective. If workers advertise their eligibility to be subsidized as disad-
vantaged, they are less likely to be hired, because of stigma effects (Burtless 
1985). Businesses are reluctant to use such subsidies to hire the disadvan-
taged. Many businesses do not bother to claim such subsidies, and if they 
do, claims are made after the hiring, for hiring that would have occurred any-
way (Hamersma 2003, 2008). 
A better design combines hiring subsidies with screening and job train-
ing that provides firms with more assurance that hires will meet skills stan-
dards. Such programs were run with some popularity with both businesses 
and social welfare groups in Minnesota in the 1980s, and as part of the stim-
ulus package for welfare recipients during the current recession. For exam-
ple, Minnesota's MEED program provided generous six-month wage subsidies 
for hiring the long-term unemployed for newly created jobs (Bartik 2001). 
However, rather than being run as a tax incentive, the program was run 
through local workforce agencies, which combined the wage subsidies with 
screening and training of eligible workers for interested businesses. 
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Although hiring subsidies combined with screening and training services 
is a promising design, it is lacking in strong evidence. Firms report in sur-
veys that such programs affect both jobs created and who is hired (Rode 1988). 
Empirical evidence suggests that recent wage subsidy and screening programs 
for hiring TANF recipients increased earnings, but this evidence does not 
come from studies with a strong experimental or quasi-experimental design 
(Roder and Elliott 2013). 
From a national perspective, if hiring subsidies lead to more employment 
for the hard-to-employ, these programs offer national benefits. By increas-
ing the employability of a group that otherwise would be less productive, such 
programs enlarge the national economy. Hiring subsidies for the disadvan-
taged at one location may lead to fewer jobs in the short run for more advan-
taged workers at other locations, but the greater availability of employable 
labor should boost overall job creation. 
Neighborhood Development Subsidies 
For neighborhood development subsidies, the strongest evidence is for en-
terprise zones. The empirical evidence on state and local enterprise zones is 
mixed. Many studies indicate no significant effects (Elvery 2009; Greenbaum 
and Landers 2009; Neumark and Kolko 2010). Other studies suggest some 
significant effects (Ham et al. 2011; Freedman 2013). 
Effects are greater for one variant of the enterprise zone concept, the 
federal Empowerment Zone program (Busso, Gregory, and Kline 2013; Ham 
et al. 2011). The difference may be that Empowerment Zones combined sub-
sidies for firms in designated neighborhoods with neighborhood services. 
These neighborhood services help the designated neighborhoods to overcome 
the barriers to redevelopment, which are not overcome through simply pro-
viding new or expanding firms with cash subsidies. 
The Busso et al. evidence uses a quasi-experimental methodology, which 
compares Empowerment Zone grantees to rejected applicants and future suc-
cessful applicants. Their methodology suggests that these Empowerment 
Zones created about 78,000 jobs at a cost of $1.7 billion, or $22,000 per job.10 
If we assume that the jobs created depreciate at 25 percent per year, and that 
the appropriate social discount rate is 3 percent, then the effective annual cost 
per permanent job equivalent would be $6,200.U 
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Economic development subsidies also sometimes target brownfields with 
tax subsidies and cleanup, or target downtowns or other areas with special 
services through tax increment financing districts. Before and after compar-
isons suggest that such services are effective in spurring development in the 
targeted neighborhoods (De Sousa 2013; Weber 2013; Dye and Merriman 
2003). 
But what about the rest of the metro area? Nearby neighborhoods do not 
seem to suffer negative spillovers in most studies; some studies find positive 
spillovers (De Sousa 2013). However, beyond nearby neighborhoods, we might 
be concerned that subsidies to locally oriented businesses in target neigh-
borhoods might reduce market shares of local businesses elsewhere in the 
metro area. Tax increment financing districts (TIPs) produce more favorable 
effects on overall area development ifTIFs target industrial rather than com-
mercial development (Dye and Merriman 2003). We might also expect that 
if neighborhood subsidies lead to usage ofland that otherwise would be un-
developed, area output would be more likely to expand, due to expansion of 
the effective land supply. However, there is no good empirical evidence on 
this hypothesis. 
From a national perspective, we would expect much of the increased ac-
tivity in some communities to be offset by the loss of jobs in other commu-
nities, due to competition in the national market. However, if redeveloping 
distressed neighborhoods leads to greater use ofland or labor that otherwise 
would be unemployed, these subsidies are more likely to expand overall na-
tional economic output. 
Conclusion: Some Policy Recommendations 
Based on this discussion, what policy advice seems warranted? First, state and 
local governments should rely less on business tax incentives. These seem less 
effective than customized services, even from a state and local perspective. 
One way to restrict tax incentives is to incorporate them into the state 
and local tax system. Discretionary tax incentives tend to gradually expand 
from their original targets. Governors and mayors find it difficult to "just say 
no." In contrast, if a legislature incorporates an incentive into the tax code, 
this requires consideration of costs. 
But state and local leaders are unlikely to accept this advice. Discretion-
ary incentives allow political leaders to claim credit for new business. With 
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an optimistic interpretation of the research, discretionary tax incentives can 
be argued to pay off from a state and local perspective. 
Because tax incentives lack a national payoff, they should be subject to 
federal regulation. One model is the incentive regulations of the European 
Union (Sinnaeve 2007). In the EU, business incentives are illegal except under 
special circumstances: EU-designated distressed regions, high-tech industries, 
small business, and job training. 
For customized business services, no special restrictions are needed, 
as such incentives are more likely to pay off from both a local and national 
perspective. But we need more research on these services' effectiveness. This 
should include experiments randomly assigning businesses to be eligible for 
services, and quasi-experiments comparing businesses across location or size 
classes that trigger eligibility for services. 
Incentives that target otherwise unemployed labor or land also need fur-
ther experimentation. We should consider experiments that randomly assign 
distressed neighborhoods to special incentives and services, or randomly as-
sign hiring incentives and screening and training services for the disadvan-
taged to both workers and firms. 
For firm-specific incentives to be more cost-effective in broadening 
urban opportunities, we need to better target such policies. This requires 
rigorous research to see which combinations of cash and services will pro-
vide the most effective targeting. 
The inefficiencies of many currently popular incentive programs also 
should encourage state and local policy makers to explore alternatives to 
incentives. For example, local labor supply policies, such as high-quality 
universal pre-K, can be viewed as a state or local economic development pro-
gram. In the case of universal pre-K, empirical research suggests that the 
benefits in higher future local earnings per capita, per dollar of program cost, 
may be better than many tax incentive programs (Bartik 2011). Policy mak-
ers should enlarge their thinking about how best to promote local economic 
development. Wise local economic development policy will evaluate many 
types of programs for promoting broadly shared local growth. 
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